| ID | 114794 |
| Title Proper | Strategic interaction in spending on environmental protection |
| Other Title Information | spatial evidence from Chinese cities |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Deng, Huihui ; Zheng, Xinye ; Huang, Nan ; Fanghua Li |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In China, the responsibility of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics, we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting. Using city-level data for China, the present study finds that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding environmental protection. This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own spending as a response to the rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbors. Hence, environmental protection tends to be underprovided. As a result, we suggest that centralizing the environmental protection responsibility to a higher level of government would be beneficial in terms of controlling pollution in China. |
| `In' analytical Note | China and World Economy Vol. 20, No.5; Sep-Oct 2012: p.103-120 |
| Journal Source | China and World Economy Vol. 20, No.5; Sep-Oct 2012: p.103-120 |
| Key Words | Environmental Protection ; Spatial Econometrics ; Strategic Interaction |