| ID | 114960 |
| Title Proper | Getting COIN at the tactical level in Afghanistan |
| Other Title Information | reassessing counter-insurgency adaptation in the British army |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Catignani, Sergio |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 35, No.4; Aug 2012: p.513-539 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 35, No.4; Aug 2012: p.513-539 |
| Key Words | Counter - Insurgency ; Military Innovation ; Afghanistan ; British Army |