| ID | 115006 |
| Title Proper | Why operations assessments fail |
| Other Title Information | it's not just the metrics |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Schroden, Jonathan |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In any military campaign, commanders, politicians, and the general public all desire to know whether the effort is succeeding. For conventional conflicts, well
developed theories of war give a good understanding of the objectives to pursue
and how to pursue them. These theories also enable the derivation of well defined metrics for progress, such as terrain held, numbers of enemy fighters killed
or captured, or amount of enemy equipment and materiel destroyed. In unconventional conflicts the theories of war are more complex, objectives and ways to
achieve them are less straightforward, and notions of "winning" and "losing" are
more difficult to define. As a result, it is also more difficult to gauge and demonstrate progress in such conflicts. For the specific case of counterinsurgency, however, gauging and demonstrating progress is at least as important as in a conventional war, since the former tends to last longer and therefore requires sustained
political and public support to conduct-and such support is often tied to proof
of progress. Thus operations assessment, designed to show whether progress is
being made, should be a vital part of any unconventional conflict, especially
counterinsurgency. |
| `In' analytical Note | Naval War College Review Vol. 64, No.4; Autumn 2011: p.89-102 |
| Journal Source | Naval War College Review Vol. 64, No.4; Autumn 2011: p.89-102 |
| Key Words | Military Campaign ; Conventional Conflicts ; Politicians ; Unconventional Conflicts ; Theories of War ; Counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; NATO ; Afghan Assessments Group |