| ID | 116235 |
| Title Proper | Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems |
| Other Title Information | comment |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kovenock, Dan ; Roberson, Brian |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 23, No.5; Oct 2012: p.507-515 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 23, No.5; Oct 2012: p.507-515 |
| Key Words | Game Theory ; OR in Military ; Conflict ; Contest ; Network ; Colonel Blotto ; Game |