| ID | 116237 |
| Title Proper | Strategic defense and attack for series And parallel reliability systems |
| Other Title Information | rejoinder |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kovenock, Dan ; Roberson, Brian |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the claims made in the reply reveal continuing misunderstandings and gaps in his understanding. In this rejoinder, we briefly clarify the fundamental issues. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 23, No.5; Oct 2012: p.521-524 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 23, No.5; Oct 2012: p.521-524 |
| Key Words | Game Theory ; OR in Military ; Conflict ; Contest ; Network ; Colonel Blotto Game |