| ID | 116240 |
| Title Proper | Democracy, deception, and entry into war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Reiter, Dan |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Realists propose that elected leaders that seek war but face a hesitant public may use deception to build public support for war. Leaders may secretly make provocative diplomatic or military moves to push the adversary to attack first, rallying the public behind a war effort seen as defensive, or publicly exaggerate the threat posed by the adversary. This paper develops a liberal institutionalist critique of this theory, positing that elected leaders are deterred from engaging in such deception because democratic political institutions such as political competition, a professionalized military, and the marketplace of ideas increase the likelihood that such moves will be exposed, and once exposed, deceptive politicians will suffer domestic political punishment. The paper examines the thesis that Franklin Roosevelt sought to provoke Germany and Japan to war in 1941, finding little support. It also finds that in general autocratic leaders are more likely than elected leaders to deceive. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 21, No.4; Oct-Dec 2012: p.594-623 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol. 21, No.4; Oct-Dec 2012: p.594-623 |
| Key Words | Democracy ; Deception ; Entry into War ; Democratic Political Institutions |