| ID | 116741 |
| Title Proper | OPEC |
| Other Title Information | market failure or power failure? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cairns, Robert D ; Calfucura, Enrique |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The actions of OPEC and Saudi Arabia are discussed in terms of their objectives and their technical and social constraints. It is concluded (1) that OPEC does not act as a cartel and (2) that Hotelling's rule is not an important feature of pricing or production. OPEC's (more specifically, Saudi Arabia's) ideal policy is to keep price moderate to try to assure a market for their high reserves over the long run. Such an action would require heavy investments in capacity, including in excess capacity, for times of interruption of supply from other countries as in the 1990s and for times of high demand as in the 2000s. The action may be inconsistent with other objectives and in any case may be too difficult to achieve. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy Vol. 50; Nov 2012: p.570-580 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy Vol. 50; Nov 2012: p.570-580 |
| Key Words | Capacity ; Natural Decline ; Limit Price |