| ID | 116786 |
| Title Proper | British campaign in Greece 1941 |
| Other Title Information | assumptions about the operational art and their influence on strategy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ewer, Peter |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article looks afresh at the decision by Britain to despatch an expeditionary force to Greece in 1941 to oppose the much-anticipated decision by Hitler, to end by German invasion the inept Italian campaign against Athens. The existing work on this topic emphasises the geo-political motives behind the campaign, especially Churchill's need to impress American public opinion by going to the aid of the Greeks, often with an assumption that British military leaders committed themselves to the venture against their better judgement. What these accounts overlook is what British planners thought was operationally possible. This article is based on new archival research, which indicates that key British leaders, throughout the chain of command, thought Greek topography would prevent the Wehrmacht from repeating the success of armoured warfare achieved by the Germans in France. In considering this material, the article sheds new light on the failure of British military leaders to fully understand the possibilities of armoured warfare, and thus adds to our understanding of the doctrinal reasons for poor British battlefield performance in the 1940-42 period more generally. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 76, No.3; Jul 2012: p.727-745 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History Vol. 76, No.3; Jul 2012: p.727-745 |
| Key Words | Britain ; Greece ; Hitler ; Italian Campaign ; Athens ; Churchill ; American Public Opinion |