| ID | 117952 |
| Title Proper | Britain's great security mirage |
| Other Title Information | the Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian naval threat, 1898-1906 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Seligmann, Matthew S |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 35, No.6; Dec 2012: p.861-886 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 35, No.6; Dec 2012: p.861-886 |
| Key Words | Royal Navy ; Threat Perception ; Armaments Races ; Anglo - French Rivalry ; Anglo - Russian Rivalry ; Anglo - German Antagonism ; Intelligence Information |