| ID | 118971 |
| Title Proper | Tying your enemy's hands in close races |
| Other Title Information | the politics of federal transfers in Brazil |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Brollo, Fernanda ; Nannicini, Tommaso |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil, and find that-in preelection years-municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated with the coalition (and especially with the political party) of the Brazilian president receive approximately one-third larger discretionary transfers for infrastructures. This effect is primarily driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No.4; Nov 2012: p.742-761 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No.4; Nov 2012: p.742-761 |
| Key Words | Brazil ; Intergovernmental Transfers ; Elections |