| ID | 120171 |
| Title Proper | Counterfeit diplomacy and mobilization in democracies |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Montgomery, Evan Braden |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How do policymakers in democratic nations mobilize support for hard-line strategies? Existing answers to this question emphasize the exaggeration of external threats. Yet this overlooks an important dilemma: because democratic citizens expect their leaders to explore peaceful solutions or less aggressive alternatives when foreign dangers are ambiguous, the same conditions that make threat inflation necessary also make it difficult to employ successfully. To mobilize support for hard-line measures when the public wants its leaders to demonstrate restraint, policymakers may therefore attempt to shift blame onto an adversary by using "counterfeit diplomacy." Specifically, democratic leaders may adopt more cooperative or less coercive options than they believe are necessary, but which they anticipate will fail. This approach can be a risky one, however, because an opponent might accept a nation's demands, accede to its conditions, or offer counterproposals in the hope of diffusing support for more confrontational measures. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 22, No.1; Jan-Mar 2013: p.33-67 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol. 22, No.1; Jan-Mar 2013: p.33-67 |
| Key Words | Counterfeit Diplomacy ; Mobilization ; Democracies |