| ID | 120284 |
| Title Proper | 1983 Nuclear crisis - lessons for deterrence theory and practice |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Adamsky, Dmitry Dima |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis - the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon - a 'culminating point of deterrence'. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 36, No.1; Feb 2013: p.4-41 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 36, No.1; Feb 2013: p.4-41 |
| Key Words | Deterrence ; Nuclear Strategy ; Nuclear Weapons ; Cold War ; International Security ; Intelligence |