| ID | 120311 |
| Title Proper | Principal-agent theory in complex operations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Coletta, Damon |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Originally developed for identifying costs of coordination between labor and management in economics, principal-agent theory challenged traditional explanations for friction in political relations, especially in a democracy, between elected officials and the permanent bureaucracy. Not without controversy, the approach recasts democratic civil-military relations, featuring as agent a unique, military 'bureaucrat' refining goals of the state, a role normally assigned to the principal. At the same time, principal-agent applications reached international institutions as a collective actor in their own right. Drawing from civil-military relations and international institutions, this article poses still greater expansion for principal-agent dynamics. Principal-agent theory offers significant promise in complex international operations mixing inter-state, state, sub-state, and nongovernmental organizations because it clearly delineates culturally bounded normative arguments from resource-based logics; it also suggests moves such as building flexible membership institutions ahead of time to improve cooperation among international actors during the next crisis. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 24, No.2; May 2013: p.306-321 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 24, No.2; May 2013: p.306-321 |
| Key Words | Principal - Agent ; International Community ; Complex Operations ; Afghanistan |