| ID | 120453 |
| Title Proper | France, Britain and the intervention in Libya |
| Other Title Information | an integrated analysis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Davidson, Jason W |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article seeks to explain the decisions by Nicolas Sarkozy's France and David Cameron's Britain to intervene in the 2011 Libyan crisis. None of the three major theories of international relations-constructivism, defensive realism and liberalism-can explain on its own such intervention decisions as the Libya case. The article's novel analytical model proposes that each theory emphasizes factors and mechanisms that explain part of the decision-making process and that these factors interact with state behaviour in complex ways. Britain and France initially began to consider intervention because they felt that the emergent norm of the 'responsibility to protect' applied to the Libyan case and because they believed the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence were a threat to their border security. Both countries believed military intervention could be successful at relatively low cost and that if they did not intervene the problem would not be solved. At that point, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments engaged in initial action that made them more likely to intervene by jeopardizing their future economic relations with the Gaddafi regime and making him more likely to threaten them with future terrorist attacks. Taking initial action also meant that French and British prestige would ultimately have suffered had they not intervened to achieve a satisfactory solution to the crisis. Paris and London viewed international and regional support as a critical prerequisite for intervention and they sought and attained it. Finally, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments were able to minimize any domestic political risk of intervening because they had public and/or opposition party support. |
| `In' analytical Note | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 26, No.2; Jun 2013: p.310-329 |
| Journal Source | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 26, No.2; Jun 2013: p.310-329 |
| Key Words | France ; Nicolas Sarkozy ; Libyan Crisis ; International Relations ; Constructivism ; Defensive Decisions ; Liberalism ; Britain ; Military Intervention ; Cameron ; Future Terrorist Attacks |