| ID | 120458 |
| Title Proper | British and American military operations in the battle of Helmand, 2006-2011 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Griffin, Christopher |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In summer 2006, elements of the British Army were deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. The US Army followed with a surge in 2009 and 2010. The British and American military forces attempted to construct a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to win the war in Helmand from 2006 until 2011, but the operational approach implemented was most often that of conventional warfighting. The inability to successfully implement COIN owed not to a lack of will, but rather to short tours, mission command, a lack of available resources, the particular situation on the ground in Helmand and the propensity of the Taliban to launch major conventional operations during much of the period in question. |
| `In' analytical Note | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 26, No.2; Jun 2013: p.411-429 |
| Journal Source | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 26, No.2; Jun 2013: p.411-429 |
| Key Words | British Army ; Helmand Province ; Afghanistan ; Counterinsurgency ; American Military Forces ; Taliban |