| ID | 120589 |
| Title Proper | Vote buying, village elections, and authoritarian rule in rural China |
| Other Title Information | a game-theoretic analysis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Takeuchi, Hiroki |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Village elections are a democratic institution in one of the most resilient authoritarian regimes in the world. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has promoted village elections over the past twenty years, but not elections at higher levels. I present a game-theoretic model in which candidates would engage in vote buying when competing in a small electorate but not when competing in a larger electorate. The model's equilibrium outcome implies that the logic of China's introduction of village elections inherently limits this democratic reform to the grassroots level. Elections for higher levels of government would be dangerous to the regime because they would lead candidates to create substantive policy platforms and political organizations. Thus, rather than being an experiment that has failed to lead to further reforms, village democracy is self-limiting by design. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 13, No.1; Jan-Apr 2013: p.69-105 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 13, No.1; Jan-Apr 2013: p.69-105 |
| Key Words | China ; Authoritarian Rule ; Authoritarian Elections ; Vote Buying ; Grassroots Elections |