| ID | 121136 |
| Title Proper | Benchmarking across borders |
| Other Title Information | electoral accountability and the necessity of comparison |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kayser, Mark Andreas ; Peress, Michael |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | When the economy in a single country contracts, voters often punish the government. When many economies contract, voters turn against their governments much less frequently. This suggests that the international context matters for the domestic vote, yet most research on electoral accountability assumes that voters treat their national economies as autarkic. We decompose two key economic aggregates-growth in real gross domestic product and unemployment-into their international and domestic components and demonstrate that voters hold incumbents more electorally accountable for the domestic than for the international component of growth. Voters in a wide variety of democracies benchmark national economic growth against that abroad, punishing (rewarding) incumbents for national outcomes that underperform (outperform) an international comparison. Tests suggest that this effect arises not from highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from "pre-benchmarking" by the media when reporting on the economy. The effect of benchmarked growth exceeds that of aggregate national growth by up to a factor of two and outstrips the international component of growth by an even larger margin, implying that previous research may have underestimated the strength of the economy on the vote. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No.3; Aug 2012: p. 661-684 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No.3; Aug 2012: p. 661-684 |
| Key Words | Economy ; Economies Contract ; Electoral Accountability ; Domestic Vote ; Unemployment |