| ID | 121244 |
| Title Proper | Investing in fighters and alliances |
| Other Title Information | Norway, Denmark, and the bumpy road to the joint strike fighter |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ringsmose, Jens |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In the spring of 1975 Norway and Denmark were faced with the choice
of how to replace their aging fleets of fighter jets. Together with Belgium
and the Netherlands, the two Nordic countries had established a "buyers'
consortium" to ensure NATO standardization and a strong bargaining
position vis-à-vis the potential suppliers; hence Copenhagen and Oslo
were in very similar situations. As the final decision was about to be made,
three candidate planes were still in the competition: the American F-16, the
Swedish Saab Viggen, and the French Dassault Mirage. After a drawn-out
and exceedingly complex decision-making process, the four European NATO
members together opted for the American contender. Surely, the Danish
and Norwegian decision to procure the F-16 had several reasons behind it-
importantly, most policymakers in both Copenhagen and Oslo considered
the American aircraft to be technically superior to its competitors-but
the choice of the F-16 was in no small part motivated by old-fashioned realpolitik. The purchase of new fighter jets was thus not only perceived as a
procurement of new military equipment but also an investment in alliances
and the transatlantic link. Accordingly, Norway and Denmark chose the
American F-16 partly because this aircraft was thought to bring the greatest
strategic benefits.1 |
| `In' analytical Note | International Journal Vol. 68, No.1; Winter 2013: p. 93-110 |
| Journal Source | International Journal Vol. 68, No.1; Winter 2013: p. 93-110 |
| Key Words | Norway ; Denmark ; Joint Strike Fighter ; F-16 ; Military Equipment ; America |