| ID | 121363 |
| Title Proper | Strategic interaction between the government and international oil companies in the UK |
| Other Title Information | an example of a country with dwindling hydrocarbon reserves |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Willigers, Bart J A ; Hausken, Kjell |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The 2011 UK tax rise on hydrocarbon exploitation activities obviously increases short term tax revenues however the longer term effects are less clear. The strategic interaction between the UK government, a producer and a shipper has been analyzed in a game theoretical model. A complex interaction between players is expected given (1) dwindling resources and large decommissioning liabilities and (2) the fact that much of the hydrocarbons produced in the North Sea are exported through an infrastructure with shared ownership.
The 2011 UK tax adjustment will most likely result in value destruction for the government, producers and shippers. Our analysis suggests that governments are unlikely to ultimately benefit from reducing their decommission liabilities at the expense of International Oil Companies. In countries with unstable tax regimes, such as the UK, International Oil Companies will adopt their strategies in anticipation of future tax changes. Their adopted strategy is a function of decommissioning liabilities and remaining reserves as well as whether they are producers, shippers or producers and shippers. The ultimate payoff of a government is a function of the remaining reserves and total decommissioning liabilities, but also depends on the distribution of these value metrics between producers and shippers. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy Vol. 57; Jun 2013: p.276-286 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy Vol. 57; Jun 2013: p.276-286 |
| Key Words | Game Theory ; UK Tax Regime ; Decommission Liabilities |