| ID | 121535 |
| Title Proper | Best little army |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gibby, Bryan |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Historians have generally assumed that the poor showing made by the South Korean military in the opening stages of the Korean War was inevitable and have attributed much of the blame for this to the U.S. Army advisory group in Korea, known colloquially as "KMAG." However, a closer look at the documentary evidence shows that KMAG was keenly aware of the South Korean military's shortcomings and was doing its best to correct them as war came. Although KMAG's program to improve the equipment and leadership of the South Korean military and to focus its efforts on conventional defense, as opposed to counterinsurgency activities, proved insufficient to stop the North Korean invasion, U.S. advisors did succeed in forging an infrastructure that allowed the South Korean army to survive and eventually to grow into a potent military force during the war. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 77, No.1; Jan 2013: p.173-201 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History Vol. 77, No.1; Jan 2013: p.173-201 |
| Key Words | South Korean Military ; Korean War ; KMAG ; South Korea ; Conventional Defense ; Counterinsurgency |