| ID | 121537 |
| Title Proper | Eating soup with a spoon |
| Other Title Information | the U.S. army as a learning organization in the Vietnam war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Daddis, Gregory A |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Standard Vietnam War narratives often argue that the U.S. Army lost the war because it failed to learn and adapt to the conditions of an unconventional conflict. Based on a reappraisal of learning processes rather than on the outcome of the war, this essay argues that as an organization, the U.S. Army did learn and adapt in Vietnam; however, that learning was not sufficient, in itself, to preserve a South Vietnam in the throes of a powerful nationalist upheaval. A reexamination of the Army's strategic approach, operational experiences, and organizational changes reveals that significant learning did occur during the Vietnam War despite the conflict's final result. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 77, No.1; Jan 2013: p.229-54 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History Vol. 77, No.1; Jan 2013: p.229-54 |
| Key Words | Vietnam War ; Unconventional Conflict ; Vietnam ; United States |