| ID | 121793 |
| Title Proper | Constrained by the bank and the ballot |
| Other Title Information | unearned revenue, democracy, and state incentives to repress |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Conrad, Courtenay R ; DeMeritt, Jacqueline HR |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why does the discovery of oil lead to increased government repression in some countries and not others? Why is there variance in the extent to which democracy constrains state violations of human rights? We assume that an executive's propensity to use violence against citizens is a function of the extent to which he is dependent on his citizenry. Executives can be dependent on their citizenry in two ways: (1) at the bank for financial resources, and (2) at the ballot box for political support. We argue that these considerations jointly influence executive decisions to engage in state repression, and consequently, observed human rights abuse. Using a dataset of 146 countries from 1981 to 2011, we find that democratic institutions have a moderating effect on the positive relationship between unearned revenues and human rights violations. Decreased reliance on citizens for revenue does not weaken and may actually strengthen the pacifying effect of democratic institutions on state terror. Our results suggest that pursuing democracy is a useful way to reduce political violence, both directly and indirectly, even in the presence of a resource curse. Furthermore, the discovery of oil and other unearned revenues is unlikely to undermine the positive relationship between democratic institutions and domestic protections for human rights. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No.1; Jan 2013: p.105-119 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No.1; Jan 2013: p.105-119 |
| Key Words | Democracy ; Human Rights ; Natural Resources ; Repression |