| ID | 121795 |
| Title Proper | Stopping the legal flow of weapons |
| Other Title Information | compliance with arms embargoes, 1981-2004 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Erickson, Jennifer L |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines sending state compliance with arms embargoes. Arms embargoes are one of the most frequently used types of economic sanctions but they are perceived as one of the least effective. One major problem with arms embargoes, many argue, is sending states' failure to implement them. Yet studies tend to focus on cases of arms embargo violations, not compliance in the context of arms export practice more broadly. Using a series of new arms embargo variables, I conduct a statistical analysis of the relationship between arms embargoes and small and major conventional arms transfers from 1981 to 2004. Contrary to popular expectations, I find that arms embargoes on average restrain sending states' arms exports. If arms embargoes do indeed have difficulty changing targets' behavior, or achieving other measures of 'success', additional explanations must also be considered. I suggest that arms embargo target selection and the intractable challenge of cutting off illicit arms flows are two important plausible alternatives. This finding also provides optimism for compliance with international commitments in the absence of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. Major exporters overall appear to implement sanctions, despite strong economic incentives to ignore them and a lack of formal accountability mechanisms to punish violators. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No.2; Mar 2013: p.159-174 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No.2; Mar 2013: p.159-174 |
| Key Words | Arms Embargoes ; Arms Transfers ; Compliance ; Sanctions |