| ID | 122220 |
| Title Proper | Myth and the small war tradition |
| Other Title Information | reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Jones, David Martin ; Smith, M L R |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 24, No.3; Jul 2013: p.436-464 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 24, No.3; Jul 2013: p.436-464 |
| Key Words | Basra ; British Army Field Manual - Volume V ; British COIN ; Charles Callwell ; Charles Gwynn ; Helmand ; Frank Ledwidge ; Mike Jackson ; Robert Thompson ; Suez Crisis |