| ID | 122396 |
| Title Proper | Afghanistan |
| Other Title Information | strategy and war termination |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Tuck, Christopher |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why has ending the war in Afghanistan proved to be so problematic? In
theory, the decision to end a war should be relatively straightforward.
One or more of the belligerents determine whether or not it is worth continuing the conflict and, as long as at least one of them decides that continuing to
fight is not worth the investment, peace is offered and the conflict terminates.
Clausewitz encapsulates this rational, commonsense approach to the ending
of war when he asserts: "Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of
the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow."1
By
this logic, and in the context of Afghanistan, the strategic dilemma associated
with how and when to end the war could have been avoided by engaging in a
rational cost-benefit analysis: how much has the war cost and what is the value
of the objectives we were pursuing? Once the former exceeded the latter, then
the Coalition should have struck a deal with the Taliban and left Afghanistan.
Instinctively, of course, we know that the decisions involved in ending a war
cannot be as simple as this rational cost-benefit analysis. But, why is that so? |
| `In' analytical Note | Parameters Vol. 42, No.3; Autumn 2012: p.44-61 |
| Journal Source | Parameters Vol. 42, No.3; Autumn 2012: p.44-61 |
| Key Words | Afghanistan ; Rational Cost - Benefit Analysis ; Investment ; Taliban |