| ID | 122397 |
| Title Proper | Futility of force and the preservation of power |
| Other Title Information | British strategic failure in America, 1780-83 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Canfield, Daniel T |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | I
n the spring of 1763 Great Britain, basking in the warm afterglow of decisive
victory in the Seven Years War, presided over a vast and unprecedented
global empire. The small island nation seemingly, and rather suddenly, found
itself without peer-enjoying a level of military and political hegemony not
seen since the days of the Roman Empire.2
It was a unique, albeit fleeting,
position. In the span of a mere twenty years, the world's preeminent global
power, despite enjoying a considerable advantage in almost every conceivable category used to calculate military potential, found itself disgraced and
defeated by a start-up nation possessing a markedly inferior conventional military capability. Crippled by a grossly burgeoning national debt, diplomatically
isolated, and politically divided at home, the North Ministry became embroiled
in a protracted and unpopular global war that its policymakers and military
leaders seemed incapable of understanding-much less winning-until it was
far too late.3 |
| `In' analytical Note | Parameters Vol. 42, No.3; Autumn 2012: p.62-79 |
| Journal Source | Parameters Vol. 42, No.3; Autumn 2012: p.62-79 |
| Key Words | Great Britain ; Global Empire ; Roman Empire ; Global Power ; Preservation of Power ; British Strategic Failure ; America |