| ID | 122548 |
| Title Proper | Learning from Lebanon |
| Other Title Information | airpower and strategy in Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lambeth, Benjamin S |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | From 12 July until 15 August 2006, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) waged a
thirty-four-day war against the Iranian terrorist proxy organization Hezbollah
in response to a well-planned raid by a team of Hezbollah combatants from
southern Lebanon into northern Israel. That raid resulted in the abduction of
two IDF soldiers, who had then been taken back into Lebanon for use as hostages.1
Code-named Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION, the greatly escalated
counteroffensive that the raid prompted has since been widely regarded as the
IDF's most inconclusive combat performance in Israel's history. Waged under
the direction of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his minister of defense at the
time, Amir Peretz, the campaign was dominated by precision standoff attacks
by the Israel Air Force (IAF) and by IDF artillery and battlefield rockets, with
no significant commitment of conventional ground troops until the last days of
fighting before a cease-fire went into effect. |
| `In' analytical Note | Naval War College Review Vol. 65, No.3; Summer 2012: p.83-104 |
| Journal Source | Naval War College Review Vol. 65, No.3; Summer 2012: p.83-104 |
| Key Words | Israel Defense Forces ; Iranian Proxy Organizations ; Hezbollah ; Lebanon ; Israel ; Israel Air Force |