| ID | 122900 |
| Title Proper | Regime type, issues of contention, and economic sanctions |
| Other Title Information | re-evaluating the economic peace between democracies |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Wallace, Geoffrey P R |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Past studies have applied insights from the democratic peace to show that democracies are also less likely to sanction one another compared to other regime types. More recent work challenges this finding by arguing that the economic peace between democracies largely disappears once methodological improvements are included along with the particular behavior of the United States as market hegemon. This article cautions that these critiques may themselves be an artifact of particularities in past data on economic sanctions. Using a larger and more representative sanctions dataset, the analysis shows that democracies do seem less likely on average to sanction each other. Furthermore, the United States does not appear to be unique in its sanctioning behavior compared to other democracies. However, the article proposes a middle ground between proponents and skeptics of an economic peace between democracies. The analysis shows that the pacifying effects of joint democracy only operate for security related sanctions, while in non-security related matters democratic constraints are less evident. The results point to the importance of considering more closely the choice of data on sanctions, but also the need to take into account the issues under contention for episodes of economic coercion. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No.4; Jul 2013: p.479-493 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No.4; Jul 2013: p.479-493 |
| Key Words | Contentious Issues ; Democratic Peace ; Economic Sanctions |