| ID | 123035 |
| Title Proper | Something is wrong with our army… |
| Other Title Information | command, leadership and Italian military failure in the first Libyan campaign, 1940-41 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Stockings, Craig |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was a military disaster for Italy. However, for all of the ethnic slurs and cultural stereotyping levelled at Italian military performance in North Africa by historians and popular authors alike, relatively little research effort invested into identifying the real military disadvantages under which Mussolini's soldiers in this theatre fought. When understood as a product of measurable and objective military factors, like the issue of leadership for example, the rout of the 10th Army takes on an entirely new complexion. The subsequent reputation of Italian soldiers as embarrassing battlefield liabilities in the Western Desert in this period is exposed as unfair. This overlooks the handicaps they fought under, and often ignores the bravery displayed in spite of them all. Like the Australians, the Italians in the Western Desert were ordinary men, no more and no less. In truth, it is singularly unsurprising that so many were killed or surrendered without putting up much real resistance. They faced challenges and conditions that would have handicapped troops from any country. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 13, No.2; Jun 2013: p.125-134 |
| Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol. 13, No.2; Jun 2013: p.125-134 |
| Key Words | Libya ; Libyan Campaign - 1940-41 ; Military Disaster ; Italian Military ; Mussolini ; Italy ; Western Desert |