| ID | 123045 |
| Title Proper | Limits of counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan |
| Other Title Information | the other side of the COIN |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Eikenberry, Karl W |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Since 9/11, two consecutive U.S. administrations have labored mightily to help Afghanistan create a state inhospitable to terrorist organizations with transnational aspirations and capabilities. The goal has been clear enough, but its attainment has proved vexing. Officials have struggled to define the necessary attributes of a stable post-Taliban Afghan state and to agree on the best means for achieving them. This is not surprising. The U.S. intervention required improvisation in a distant, mountainous land with de jure, but not de facto, sovereignty; a traumatized and divided population; and staggering political, economic, and social problems. Achieving even minimal strategic objectives in such a context was never going to be quick, easy, or cheap. |
| `In' analytical Note | Foreign Affairs Vol. 92, No.5; Sep-Oct 2013: p.59-74 |
| Journal Source | Foreign Affairs Vol. 92, No.5; Sep-Oct 2013: p.59-74 |
| Key Words | Afghanistan ; 9/11 ; Post Taliban Afghan State ; Counterinsurgency Doctrine ; Iraq ; Marines ; United States ; Military Doctrine |