| ID | 124002 |
| Title Proper | Examining the NGPI dots |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lahneman, William J |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to "connect the dots." No one component holds all the relevant information.
The 9/11 Commission Report, 22 July 2004, p. 408.
Although the 9/11 Commission Report 1 is over 400 pages long, its catchphrase about the Intelligence Community's (IC's) failure to "connect the dots" most succinctly captures one of the principal things that went wrong with the U.S government's efforts in general, and the IC's attempts in particular, to detect al-Qaeda's attack plans. General agreement prevails that the chance of detecting al-Qaeda's plans would have been improved if the IC had been able to pool, fuse, and analyze all of the relevant information about al-Qaeda's plans that various U.S. government agencies possessed prior to the attacks. As a result, the Commission strongly emphasized the need to improve information sharing across multiple IC and other government agencies to improve the IC's chances of detecting future attacks. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Vol. 26, No.4; Winter 2013: p.730-743 |
| Journal Source | International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Vol. 26, No.4; Winter 2013: p.730-743 |
| Key Words | National Intelligence ; 9/11 ; Commission Report ; Intelligence Community ; United States ; Al Qaeda ; Future Attacks ; National Security Strategy (NSS) ; Homeland Security Act - 2002 ; Intelligence Reform Act - 2004 ; National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) |