| ID | 125253 |
| Title Proper | Regional-centric deterrence |
| Other Title Information | reassessing its efficacy for South Asia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Khan, Zulfqar ; Abbasi, Rizwana |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is generally believed that a stable nuclear deterrence averts wars between nuclear adversaries, and makes peace secure. This conceptual argument has merit in terms of the prevention of all-out war; but it does not fully address the need to prevent the outbreak of a limited war between two nuclear weapon states. India and Pakistan have already fought one limited war, Kargil, in a nuclear environment. These two relatively new nuclear weapon states rely on nuclear deterrence to address the external threats. While frequently occurring conflicts demonstrate this, a recurrence of limited war cannot be ruled out in this crisis-ridden region, which would be fraught with significant dangers of escalation. Using a qualitative research approach and deploying a structural deterrence theory as a conceptual guiding tool, this paper investigates the nuclear future of the region, including the prospects of war, conflict termination strategy, escalation control, escalation dominance mechanisms, and finally suggests some pertinent lessons for crisis stability. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol.25, No.4; 2013: p.489-501 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol.25, No.4; 2013: p.489-501 |
| Key Words | Regional-Centric Deterrence ; Tactical Nuclear Weapons - TNW ; Cold War ; Start Doctrine ; Escalation Control ; Escalation Dominance ; Nuclear Deterrence ; South Asia ; Crisis Stability ; Conflict Termination ; Strategy ; Nuclear Weapons |