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ID127127
Title ProperTechnical negotiations in a political environment
Other Title Informationwhy the Hexapartite safeguards project succeeded
LanguageENG
AuthorKessler, J Christian
Publication2013.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Despite a political environment fraught with core policy differences, between 1979 and 1983, six governments and two international safeguards directorates-the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate-negotiated an agreement to preserve the core verification principles behind the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At first, even agreement to talk was in doubt. Other governments questioned US motives; they wondered whether US motives in promoting the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation had been to evaluate or to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from deploying uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies. In addition, Germany and Japan disagreed with the United States on whether NPT safeguards were to address undeclared materials or activities. Notwithstanding this environment, the participants reached agreement first to negotiate, and then on specific technical measures, even when the approach implied a policy consensus where none existed. At the conclusion, agreement was reached on specific technical measures for safeguards at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants, and all participating states, including two nuclear weapon states, made diplomatic commitments to adopt this approach for current and future centrifuge plants. This article examines the factors that facilitated agreement and considers what lessons can be learned for future efforts to solve complex technical issues in a politically charged environment and in the absence of complete agreement even on the objectives to be realized.
`In' analytical NoteNonproliferation Review Vol. 20, No.3; Nov 2013: p.493-508
Journal SourceNonproliferation Review Vol. 20, No.3; Nov 2013: p.493-508
Key WordsSafeguards ;  Highly Enriched Uranium ;  Gas Centrifuge ;  Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons International Atomic Energy Agency ;  Euratom ;  URENCO


 
 
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