| ID | 127994 |
| Title Proper | Non-proliferation and preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kelle, Alexander |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Over the past 15 years of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
the destruction of existing chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles by possessor states and the
verification of these destruction activities through the inspectorate of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has received the greatest attention and bound the
most resources of the organisation. With CW destruction being wound down, this is bound to
change substantially. As a matter of fact, first signs of this reorientation of the OPCW are already
visible in the organisation's programme and budget for 2011 and 2012, the latter of which was
agreed at the 16th session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) last December, with
fewer resources devoted to the inspection of CW destruction activities and a higher number of
inspections of so-called other chemical production facilities (OCPF) agreed.1
Although there is
no consensus yet among States Parties on how the future OPCW and its portfolio of key tasks
will exactly look, it is clear that non-proliferation or, as it is increasingly called, the prevention
of the re-emergence of chemical weapons will form a central component of future OPCW
activities. |
| `In' analytical Note | Disarmament Forum vol. , No.1; 2012: p.55-64 |
| Journal Source | Disarmament Forum vol. , No.1; 2012: p.55-64 |
| Key Words | Chemical Weapons Convention ; Chemical Weapons Stockpiles ; OPCW |