ID | 128018 |
Title Proper | Pakistan's minimum deterrence and its policy approach toward fissile materials |
Other Title Information | security concerns and the region's changed strategic environment |
Language | ENG |
Author | Khan, Zafar |
Publication | 2014. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | In the immediate aftermath of nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, Pakistan opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, which entailed that Pakistan would not need a larger number of nuclear deterrent forces, as a small number of them would be sufficient to deter. The concept of a minimum deterrence existed even before Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. However, later Islamabad realized that minimum could not be sustained as earlier conceptualized. It needed to be evolving and dynamic. Minimum deterrence (MD) transformed into minimum credible deterrence (MCD) which had policy implications for Pakistan's force-building structure. Among its force building, Pakistan not only upgrades its deterrent forces, but also builds more nuclear reactors which makes Islamabad reluctant to withdraw its veto from the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It requires more fissile materials in order to enhance its deterrent credibility. Why does Islamabad do this, and if its policy approach remains consistent with the minimum deterrence it conceptualized earlier? This article examines the rudimentary factors that increase Pakistan's security concerns and elaborates on Pakistan's post-1998 shifting policy approach toward fissile materials in the region's changed strategic environment. |
`In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 26, No.1; Mar 2014: p.51-64 |
Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 26, No.1; Mar 2014: p.51-64 |
Key Words | Minimum Deterrence ; Pakistan's Policy Toward Fissile Materials ; FMCT ; Security Concerns ; Region's Changed Strategic Environment ; Pakistan’s Policy Toward Fissile Materials ; Region’s Changed Strategic Environment |