| ID | 128578 |
| Title Proper | Counterinsurgency force ratio |
| Other Title Information | strategic utility or nominal necessity |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Moore, Riley M |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, 'How many troops does it take to get the job done?' This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several 'plug-and-play' equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, 'How many of our troops does it take to get the job done? |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.24, No.5; Dec.2013: p.856-877 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.24, No.5; Dec.2013: p.856-877 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; COIN ; Force ratio ; Counterinsurgency field manual ; FM 3\-24 ; Counterterrorism ; Malaya ; Northern Ireland ; Algeria ; Thailand ; Iraq ; Afghanistan ; United States ; United Kingdom ; Syria ; Counterinsurgency success ; Center of gravity |