| ID | 128840 |
| Title Proper | Russia and Ukraine |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Charap, Samuel ; Darden, Keith |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The West has often assumed that Russia is inherently hostile to Ukraine, and the Marchevents seem to validate that assumption. But Moscow's moves are in fact a realdeparture from previous Russian policy.
In his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington makes the case for the utility of an external enemy in maintaining a coherent US national identity. 'For self-definition and motivation, people need enemies', he wrote.1 His thesis has been widely discredited. But recent developments in Ukraine seem to have partially validated the claim, and given it a new dimension. After 25 years of the West treating Russia as an enemy in Ukraine, Moscow might have really become one. Even prior to recent events, the depiction of Russian policy in Ukraine as nefarious has always, of course, held a kernel of truth. Russia's actions there since the Soviet collapse have been far from constructive and transparent. And the rhetoric of senior officials - in a particular notorious example, Vladimir Putin himself questioned whether Ukraine was a real country in a private moment with George W. Bush - has at times been inflammatory, subversive or incendiary.
But until the collapse of the EU-brokered political settlement on 21 February, Russia's actions in Ukraine had never merited the labels usually ascribed to them: expansionist, neo-imperial, neo-Soviet, aggressive, and so on. Indeed, until that watershed moment, it would have been wrong to attribute any significant development in Ukraine's recent political crisis to Russia. Yes, in the autumn of 2013 Russia did use economic levers to demonstrate to President Victor Yanukovich the costs of proceeding with the proposed Association Agreement with the EU. But it was Yanukovich, at the end of the day, and not Putin, who decided to make the shift - and it is unlikely that the Ukrainian president was serious about implementing the agreement in the first place. Even so, Russia's levers in Ukraine are entirely of the Ukrainians' making. If Yanukovich or any of his predecessors had spent less time getting rich off the gas trade with Russia, and more time implementing a comprehensive energy-efficiency policy (Ukraine has one of the world's highest rates of energy consumption per unit of GDP), creating a domestic gas market and forging an investment climate conducive to the development of Ukraine's own gas reserves, Moscow would not have had any significant economic leverage. The effectiveness of economic coercion in this case is no credit to Russia's strength; rather, it is a reflection of the utter failure of the Ukrainian elite to reform the country's economy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Survival: the IISS Quarterly Vol.56, No.2; April-May 2014: p.7-14 |
| Journal Source | Survival: the IISS Quarterly Vol.56, No.2; April-May 2014: p.7-14 |
| Key Words | Russia ; Ukraine ; World Order ; Russian Policy ; Ukraine Crisis ; Conflicts ; International Relations ; Civil War - Ukraine ; World Politics ; World Power ; International Cooperation ; International Strategy ; Economic Crisis - Ukraine ; Russia - Ukraine Relations ; International Conflitcs ; Central Asia ; Eurasia ; Europe ; United Nations - UN ; NATO ; European Union - EU ; United States - US ; Western Power ; Economic Condition |