| ID | 130231 |
| Title Proper | Enduring inefficiencies in counterintelligence by reducing type i and type ii errors through parallel systems |
| Other Title Information | a principal-agent typology |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Calista, Donald J |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A lot of time we are chasing shadows, but it's better to do that than find out later you let something get by. (An FBI field agent-Type I Error or a false positive). 1
The best chance for success [terrorists] have is to get somebody who is not a visitor [to] come in as a permanent resident or citizen, who knows the culture and how to move around, who doesn't have a record, so as not to get picked up by a database. (A former senior U.S. intelligence official-Type II Error or a false negative). 2
These two citations reflect divergent responses to the governance structures of terror organizations that continue to be subjects of interest and debate among scholars and practitioners. The operational character of terrorism remains essential to the development of strategic initiatives by counterintelligence (CI) agencies. To position CI more advantageously certain concepts from New Institutional Economics (NIE) might be utilized. 3 NIE's central formulation of principals and agents assumes that people make rational choices in determining whether to plan their transactions (relationship costs) into one of two kinds of configurations: market (decentralized) versus non-market (centralized) endeavors. Effectively, the challenge is to determine which transactional method offers greater prospects to achieve efficiency. Inherent limitations (externalities) of time, place and resources complicate these choices. Those involved can be divided into owners (principals) and workers or suppliers (agents). In fulfilling any agreed upon duties, transaction costs then center on the degree to which principals undertake monitoring the behavior of agents for possible shirking-referenced by NIE as the "agency problem." |
| `In' analytical Note | International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol.27, No.1, Spring 2014: p.109-131 |
| Journal Source | International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol.27, No.1, Spring 2014: p.109-131 |
| Key Words | Enduring Inefficiencies ; Counterintelligence ; Parallel Systems ; Typology ; Strategic Initiatives ; Terrorism ; Violence ; Terror Organizations ; Contrarian Strategy ; CIA ; FBI ; NIA ; United States - US |