| ID | 130326 |
| Title Proper | Win-win solution for Iran's Arak reactor |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ahmad, Ali ; Hippel, Frank von ; Glaser, Alexander ; Mian, Zia |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed on a six-month Joint Plan of Action to enable negotiations on a final settlement to contain the proliferation risks from Iran's nuclear program. This interim agreement freezes Iran's enrichment capacity, thereby preventing a further shortening of the time Iran would require to produce weapons quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) if it wished.1 This enrichment capacity has expanded greatly over the years since it first came to international attention in 2002. Iran and the P5+1 also have agreed on the need to constrain Iran's option to produce plutonium for weapons using the reactor that is under construction near the city of Arak and that will be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran has agreed to freeze the Arak reactor project for six months.2 It also has committed not to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel or construct a facility capable of doing so. These are important interim commitments. According to Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Arak reactor is intended for radioisotope production and testing of nuclear fuel and materials. In response to the P5+1 proposal that Iran scrap the Arak reactor project, Salehi stated that "we see no point stopping the work on this reactor." He has acknowledged, however, the international community's concerns about the Arak reactor and offered the possibility of design changes "in order to produce less plutonium in this reactor and in this way allay the worries and mitigate the concerns. |
| `In' analytical Note | Arms Control Today Vol.44, No.3; April 2014: p.8-13 |
| Journal Source | Arms Control Today Vol.44, No.3; April 2014: p.8-13 |
| Key Words | Iran ; Arak Reactor ; Nuclear Proliferation Treaty - NPT ; Nuclear Power ; Nuclear Weapons ; P5+1 ; China- P5+1 ; France - P5+1 ; Germany - P5+1 ; Russia- P5+1 ; United Kingdom- UK ; United States - US ; International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA ; Highly Enriched Uranium - HEU ; International Organization - IO ; International Cooperation - IC ; International Politics ; Nuclear Politics |