| ID | 131468 |
| Title Proper | Naw Bahar District 2010-11 |
| Other Title Information | a case study of counterinsurgency conducted by naval special warfare in Afghanistan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Briggs, Thomas |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.25, No.1; February 2014: p.122-136 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.25, No.1; February 2014: p.122-136 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgencies ; Insurgencies ; Afghanistan ; Counter-Terrorism ; Naval Warfare ; Special Warfare ; Naval Strategy ; Naval Operation ; Zabul Province - Afghanistan ; Tactical Level ; Operating Environment |