| ID | 131604 |
| Title Proper | Misestimation |
| Other Title Information | explaining US failures to predict nuclear weapons programs |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Montgomery, Alexander H ; Mount, Adam |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Various policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons, yet all rely on sound intelligence about the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States' record of estimating foreign weapons programs has been uneven, overestimating the progress made by some proliferators while underestimating others. This paper seeks to catalogue and evaluate the intelligence work surrounding 16 of the 25 states that are thought to have pursued nuclear weapons and to provide a framework for evaluating the causes of distorted intelligence estimates of nuclear proliferation. In particular, we identify 12 specific hypotheses related to politics, culture, bureaucracy and organizational culture, then explore how they play out in practice through two case studies (North Korea and Israel). We find that the US has overestimated nuclear programs much more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated them. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 29, No.3; Jun 2014: p.357-386 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 29, No.3; Jun 2014: p.357-386 |
| Key Words | Misestimation ; Nuclear Weapons Programs ; United States ; Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Proliferation |