| ID | 132323 |
| Title Proper | War and the reelection motive |
| Other Title Information | examining the effect of term limits |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zeigler, Sean ; Pierskalla, Jan H ; Mazumder, Sandeep |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international conflict. Theories of political survival and diversionary war both imply term limits should play a role in international relations, whereas "permanent referendum theory," largely motivated by work in American politics, suggests otherwise. Drawing on these theories, we formulate and test competing hypotheses regarding term limits and international crises. Using dyadic militarized interstate disputes data and information on forty-eight democracies with term limits, we uncover strong evidence to support the claim that leaders reaching final terms in office are more likely to initiate conflict than those still subject to reelection. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of conflict initiation is significantly higher during times of recession, but only in the absence of binding term limits. While binding electoral terms and economic downturns are both independently associated with increased levels of conflict initiation, in concert their conditional effects actually counteract each other. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.58, No.4; June 2014: p.658-684 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.58, No.4; June 2014: p.658-684 |
| Key Words | International Conflict ; Term Limits ; Diversionary War ; Domestic Politics ; Reelection Motive ; International Crisis ; International Relations - IR ; United States - US ; American Politics ; Electoral Terms ; Economic Downturns ; Conflict Initiation ; Political Context ; Militarized Interstate Disputes - MID |