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ID132391
Title ProperImmovable positions
Other Title Informationpublic acknowledgment and bargaining in military basing negotiations
LanguageENG
AuthorBrown, Jonathan N
Publication2014.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders' hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.
`In' analytical NoteSecurity Studies Vol. 23, No.2; Apr-Jun 2014: p.258-292
Journal SourceSecurity Studies Vol. 23, No.2; Apr-Jun 2014: p.258-292
Key WordsCooperative Security Negotiations ;  Public Opinion ;  Public Acknowledgment ;  International Power ;  Security Dilemma


 
 
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