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ID132416
Title ProperMaking of an accidental crisis
Other Title Informationthe United States and the NATO dual-track decision of 1979
LanguageENG
AuthorFreeman, Stephanie
Publication2014.
Summary / Abstract (Note)This analysis re-examines the Carter Administration's formulation of policy on the theatre nuclear force issue following the neutron bomb affair. It demonstrates that European leaders did not foist the arms control component of the NATO dual-track decision on Jimmy Carter. Rather, the Carter Administration understood the merits of an arms control component following the August 1978 PRM-38 review and thought that Soviet-American arms control negotiations would play a crucial role in resolving the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over theatre nuclear forces. This analysis also considers the previously unexamined interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the months leading to the dual-track decision. It reveals that American officials underestimated the degree of Soviet anger over the dual-track decision, believing that arms control negotiations with the Soviets on theatre nuclear forces would be possible and productive. The Carter Administration did not foresee the Euromissiles crisis.
`In' analytical NoteDiplomacy and Statecraft Vol.25, No.2; June 2014: p.331-355
Journal SourceDiplomacy and Statecraft Vol.25, No.2; June 2014: p.331-355
Key WordsNATO ;  United States - US ;  Accidental Crisis ;  International Alliance - IA ;  International Relations - IR ;  International Cooperation - IC ;  International Association ;  International Agenda ;  Conflicts ;  Violence ;  Theatre Nuclear Force ;  European Leaders ;  Warsaw Pact ;  Arms Control Treaty - ACT ;  Soviet Union ;  Nuclear Arsenal ;  Dual-Track Decision ;  Euromissiles Crisis