| ID | 132813 |
| Title Proper | China looms large |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Sawhney, Pravin ; Wahab, Ghazala |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | India's national security, especially its defence preparedness against Pakistan and China, with whom it has disputed border, is passing through a disturbing phase. Pakistan continues with cross border terrorism into Jammu and Kashmir, while China infringes upon Indian land and air space from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh at will. Both have made a mockery of the military-held lines with India.
Speaking in Parliament during the recent budget session, defence minister Arun Jaitley expressed satisfaction regarding the two disputed borders. According to him, the Indian Army has minimised infiltration across the Line of Control and terrorism in the hinterland with a mix of good anti-infiltration deployment, monitoring and surveillance means, and the fence. Chinese intrusions, he said, are because of differing perception of the disputed border by the two countries.
Do we want better detection and elimination of terrorists in Kashmir, or do we want to compel Pakistan to stop infiltration? If India does not intrude into Chinese land, why should China do this to India regularly?
India seems to have accepted low defence thresholds against both neighbours. This is worrisome. If Pakistan and China are not deterred by India and its military power, especially boots on the ground, will India's two-front war strategy work to compel them? Why is India spending nearly USD 49 billion annually, which excludes defence pensions and nuclear weapons capability, on defence when it appears blunted? Is there a way out for India without going to war with either or both?
India needs a transformation of its national security and defence thinking. It must know that China rather than Pakistan is its irreconcilable adversary, and the disputed border with China is India's singular core concern which impedes India's rise. Once this is grasped, a new approach to policy-making and warfare would emerge. China could be balanced by a political-military methodology, while peace could be made with Pakistan. India's warfare practised so far would alter drastically. With China as the main adversary, India would no longer be preparing to fight the last war better. With more domains like space, cyber, ballistic and cruise missiles, irregular warriors (terrorists) and nuclear weapons added to the conventional combat on land, air and sea, India will need different higher defence organisation and higher strategic organisation from those proposed so far. All this can be done without raising either annual defence allocations or ringing alarm bells in the region. |
| `In' analytical Note | Force Vol.11, No.12; Aug.2014: p.38-52 |
| Journal Source | Force Vol.11, No.12; Aug.2014: p.38-52 |
| Key Words | India ; China ; Pakistan ; India - China - Relations ; India - Pakistan - Relations ; Border Terrorism ; Jammu and Kashmir - J&K ; Military Strategy ; Warfare Strategy ; Irregular Warriors - Terrorist ; Strategic Organization ; Territorial Conflicts ; Political Military Methodology ; Cruise Missiles ; Nuclear Weapons ; National Security - India ; India - China - War 1962 ; NEFA ; Nuclear Strategy - 1998 ; Operation Parakram - 2001-2002 ; Nehru - Zhou Accord ; Political Dialogue |