| ID | 132924 |
| Title Proper | World War I as a self-fulfilling catastrophe |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lindemann, Thomas |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is a quite common conviction in international relations (IR) theory that what George Kennan called the 'original catastrophe' was predetermined and unavoidable. These explanations of World War I consider the conflict primarily as an inevitable by-product of material structures.1 On the one hand, are those who emphasize the impact of international system's constraints on state behavior - rigid alliances, bipolarization between great powers, the arms race, rivalry dynamics and so on.2 Yet, others regard countries' domestic structures as fundamental component in the outbreak of a diversionary war.3 If taken too far, these approaches can imply that the war was both rational and inevitable in that it was the logical consequence of internal and external tensions. Most importantly, these perspectives fail to take into account leaders' corresponding representations and narratives of 'material' reality and their role on the decision-making process. This essay devotes special attention to the hitherto neglected narrative dimension of World War I.4 In the following, I will propose a new interpretation for German brinkmanship during the July crisis. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Relations Vol.28, No.2; Jun.2014: p.268-273 |
| Journal Source | International Relations Vol.28, No.2; Jun.2014: p.268-273 |
| Key Words | Warfare History ; Warfare Strategy ; World War - I ; Deterrence ; Great War ; Great Power ; Germany ; United Kingdom ; Russia ; United States ; German Foreign Policy ; Sarajevo Crisis ; International Crisis ; International Order ; International Relations - IR ; July Crisis ; George Kennan ; International System ; Internal Tension ; External Tension |