| ID | 133277 |
| Title Proper | Who gets to be in the room |
| Other Title Information | manipulating participation in WTO disputes |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Johns, Leslie ; Pelc, Krzysztof J |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Third parties complicate World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement by adding voices and issues to a dispute. However, complainants can limit third parties by filing cases under Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rather than Article XXII. We argue that third parties create "insurance" by lowering the benefit of winning and the cost of losing a dispute. We construct a formal model in which third parties make settlement less likely. The weaker the complainant's case, the more likely the complainant is to promote third party participation and to settle. Article XXII cases are therefore more likely to settle, controlling for the realized number of third parties, and a complainant who files under Article XXIII is more likely to win a ruling and less likely to see that ruling appealed by the defendant. We provide empirical support using WTO disputes from 1995 to 2011. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Organization Vol.68, No.3; Sum.2014: p.663-699 |
| Journal Source | International Organization Vol.68, No.3; Sum.2014: p.663-699 |
| Key Words | World Trade Organization - WTO ; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATE ; International Dispute ; International Settlement ; International Organization - IO ; International Cooperation - IC ; Economic Cooperation ; Empirical Support ; Trade dispute ; International Trade |