| ID | 133654 |
| Title Proper | Targeting, accountability and capture in development projects |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Winters, Matthew S |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | If development projects are to be effective, a minimum requirement is that the funding reaches its intended destination. Yet the history of international development is replete with examples of this not happening. I argue that there will be fewer problems with corruption or other diversions of funding-which I jointly label capture-in more precisely targeted projects. More well-defined targeting results in superior accountability relationships because there is greater clarity of responsibility, clearer information about outcomes, and improved identifiability of stakeholders. I use an original cross-country, cross-project data set on the incidence of capture in World Bank-funded investment projects to test the theory. The data show a negative relationship between targeting and capture, and I demonstrate that this relationship is robust to a variety of specifications. In addition, I find that there is a higher baseline likelihood of project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt according to commonly used survey-based measures from Transparency International and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, cross-validating those measures and my own |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol.58, No.2; Jun.2014: p.393-404 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol.58, No.2; Jun.2014: p.393-404 |
| Key Words | Development Agenda ; Development Strategy ; Development Policy ; Development Project ; Accountability ; Superior Accountability ; Transparency ; International Governance ; Worldwide Governance ; Economic Accountability ; Economic Development ; Word Bank ; IMF ; International Organization - IO ; International Standards |