| ID | 133993 |
| Title Proper | South African rollback |
| Other Title Information | revisiting monitoring and verification lessons after 20 years |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Busch, Nathan E ; Pilat, Joseph F |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | As the only country in history to have created, then voluntarily renounced, a nuclear arsenal, South Africa is often referenced as a potential model for nuclear disarmament. However, this article argues that there are sharp limitations on the extent to which the South African case can be applied as a model for other countries to follow. Because South Africa unilaterally dismantled its program and only brought in inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and key member states after the dismantlement was complete, information vital to the verification process was lost to the international community. As a model of a cooperative verification, South Africa thus highlights both the difficulties that monitoring and verification regimes will encounter, as well as the opportunities that they afford. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol.33, No.3; Jul-Aug.2014: p.236-261 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol.33, No.3; Jul-Aug.2014: p.236-261 |
| Key Words | South Africa ; International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA ; Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Arsenal ; International Community - IC ; International Organization - IO ; International Cooperation - IC ; Nuclear Disarmament ; Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT |