| ID | 133995 |
| Title Proper | Cyber war and deterrence stability |
| Other Title Information | post-START nuclear arms control |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cimbala, Stephen J |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol.33, No.3; Jul-Aug.2014: p.279-286 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol.33, No.3; Jul-Aug.2014: p.279-286 |
| Key Words | Cyber War ; Nuclear Deterrence ; Military Strategy ; Arms Control Treaty ; Nuclear Arms ; Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Arsenal ; Precision Strike Systems ; Cyber-Attacks ; Strike Systems ; Precision Strike ; Cyber Capabilities ; Political Escalation ; Political Transparency ; Nuclear Command-Control Systems - NCCS |